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Abstract
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets.
Our explanation is based on strategic uncertainty and strategic unraveling. We identify
a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers.
As a consequence, an agent may make an early offer because she is concerned that others
are making early offers. Yet other agents make early offers because they are concerned
that others worry about early offers; and so on and so forth. The end result is that any
given agent is more likely to make an early offer than a late offer.
JEL classification numbers: C72; D78; D82
Key words: Two-sided matching; unraveling; strategic complementarity; assortative
matching.
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1 Introduction
We study unraveling in labor markets, and in matching markets in general. Unraveling
is a phenomenon by which matches are made too early. They are made at a point in
time when there is too little information about the quality of a match. The literature
has documented many episodes of unraveling: the market for medical interns is a famous
example, in which labor contracts for interns were signed two years before the future
interns would graduate (see Roth (1984) or Roth and Sotomayor (1990)). Other examples
of unraveling include the market for federal court clerks (Avery, Jolls, Posner, and Roth,
2001; Roth, 2013), for gastroenterology fellows (Niederle and Roth, 2003, 2004), for
college football games (Fre´chette, Roth, and U¨nver, 2007; Roth, 2012), and for placement
in sororities (Mongell and Roth, 1991).
We explain unraveling of the timing of offers as the result of strategic unraveling.
If some agents go early, it becomes more attractive for other agents to go early, which
makes it more attractive for even more agents to go early. Our explanation is reminiscent
of models of bank runs, where strategic complementarity makes agents undertake an
inefficient action because they are concerned that others may take this inefficient action
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). As we shall see, the matching environment is quite different
from models of bank runs, but the basic logic of strategic unraveling is similar.
Strategic unraveling in our model proceeds as follows. There is a loss in efficiency
when some agents go early: Information about the quality of the matches arrives late,
so it is better for efficiency to wait until the information has arrived to make a match.
If some agents go early anyway, this forces later matches to be less efficient. The result
is a negative externality that makes it more tempting for all agents to go early. It may
push some additional agents over the threshold by which they decide to go early. In turn,
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these additional agents going early makes it even more tempting to go early—and so on
and so forth.
We show that, as a result of such strategic unraveling, any given agent is more likely
to go early than go late. Our model assumes that there are two periods, and that there
is incomplete information over the agents’ discount factor. We view the incomplete in-
formation simply as modeling device: as a way of generating the strategic uncertainty
that allows the logic of unraveling to apply. If an agent goes early, they have no informa-
tion about the quality of a match. If an agent goes late, then all information has been
released, and matching is assortative on the quality of an agent as a partner (highest
quality agents match with each other, the second highest match with each other, and so
on).
Such assumptions allow us to calculate precisely (or at least to bound) the effects
of strategic unraveling. They allow us to measure how far strategic unraveling pushes
agents to go early. We can then verify that unraveling goes all the way to making each
individual more likely to go early than to go late. There are ways in which our model
is rigged against unraveling (it makes late matching particularly attractive, and rules
our unraveling purely as the result of coordination failure), yet the model produces early
contracting as the modal outcome.1
A more precise statement of our results follows. We first assume that only firms are
strategic. Workers always accept the offers they receive. In this environment, we show
that there is always a full unraveling Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which all firms make
early offers. Further, in any symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, a firm makes an early
offer with probability at least 3/4.
If we assume that the prior over discount factors is uniform, we can say more. There
are exactly two symmetric equilibria when the size of the market is at least 11. One is
the full unraveling equilibrium, but it is unstable. In the second equilibrium, which is
stable, agents go early with probability larger than 3/4. As the size of the market grows,
the probability of going early in the second equilibrium converges to 3/4. If the number
of agents is lower than or equal to 10, the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium
is the full unraveling equilibrium.
In second place, we consider a model where both sides of the market are strategic.
Our results continue to apply (there is actually not a substantial conceptual difference
between the two models). Among other things, we prove that in any symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, the expected proportion of agents that match early is at least 1/2.
1Continuing with the similarity with bank runs, the result is reminiscent of the literature on global
games, where basic assumptions on the structure of signals give a precise calculation of how far iterated
elimination of dominated strategies will go (Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner, 2003). There is, however, a
clear difference with the literature on bank runs. A run can be explained purely by coordination failure.
Agents’ payoffs in our model are biased against unraveling, and coordination failure alone would not
suffice to make agents unravel.
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Our results reveal that there may exist an equilibrium pattern of adherence and non-
adherence to the hiring dates. The market may become segmented in equilibrium, with
one segment hiring early and the other waiting to match in the final period with full
information about agents’ qualities. This prediction differs from the situation in some
settings where an initial level of non-adherence grows and adherence drops over time.
In contrast, we demonstrate that a mixed level of adherence can be sustainable in an
equilibrium, which is consistent with the empirical evidence (Avery, Jolls, Posner, and
Roth, 2001).
1.1 Related Literature
Ours is the first theoretical study that identifies strategic uncertainty as the main force
behind the unraveling of matching markets. One empirical investigation of the market
for medical interns also attributes unraveling to strategic uncertainty: Wetz, Seelig,
Khoueiry, and Weiserbs (2010) write that early contracting is motivated by concerns
over losing interns to other programs who operate out of the match. Their explanation,
based on agents’ observed behavior in the market, is essentially what we have tried to
capture formally in the present paper.
The best-known episode of unraveling is the case of the market for hospital interns
before 1945 (Roth, 1984; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Roth, 2002). There is evidence that
unraveling still exists in this market: Wetz, Seelig, Khoueiry, and Weiserbs (2010) study
out-of-match residency offers during the year 2007. In the market for interns, some
interns are allowed to take outside-the-match offers (for instance, osteopathic medical
students and international medical graduates). Wetz, Seelig, Khoueiry, and Weiserbs
(2010) find that 15.7% of the total number of postgraduate year-1 positions available in
the three primary care and four procedural and/or lifestyle-oriented specialities studied,
were offered outside the match. The authors conclude that about one in five positions
in nonprocedural, primary care specialties were offered outside the match and, thus, the
situation is similar to that which existed before 1952.
One classic explanation of unraveling is the “stability hypothesis,” as formulated by
Roth (1991) and Kagel and Roth (2000). This hypothesis affirms that unraveling will be
prevented if once the relevant information is revealed, a stable matching is implemented
through a clearinghouse. The idea is that, in some sense, the market is trying to establish
a stable matching. It simply may be doing so in an inefficient manner. Our paper provides
some justification for central clearing houses. There is a clear efficiency gain from late
contracting in our model, and late contracting equals a stable matching. The agents’
strategic behavior prevents the market from reaching this stable matching, and makes
the market unravel.
A handful other papers provide theoretical explanations for unraveling. They focus
on different mechanisms than the one we have studied here.
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Li and Rosen (1998) and Li and Suen (2000) study a model with transfers (a model
based on Shapley and Shubik’s (1971) assignment game) in which early contracting pro-
vides insurance. They show that unraveling may occur among workers who appear to be
most promising a priori, before full information is revealed. As we explain in Section 3,
our model does not have an insurance motive for early unraveling. Our paper focuses on
a different explanation for unraveling.
Damiano, Li, and Suen (2005) present an explanation of unraveling that is based on
search and matching. Agents know their qualities, so there is no informational gain from
matching late, but an agent may not meet a partner of sufficiently high quality in a given
period. If there are costs to searching, then there is unraveling in how willing agents are
to accept a partner. In Damiano, Li, and Suen (2005), unraveling is triggered by search
costs. In our model, it is triggered by incomplete information.
Du and Livne (2013) consider the role of transfers in unraveling. They show that,
in the absence of transfers, and in the limit as the market size grows, a substantial
number of agents will contract early. Unraveling in their paper happens because new
agents arrive over time, and agents who are in relatively high positions may want to
contract early because the new arrivals may be of higher match qualities. In contrast, in
a flexible-transfer regime, agents will not unravel.
Niederle, Roth, and U¨nver (2009) explain unraveling as the result of an imbalance
between demand and supply. Unraveling arises when there is a surplus of applicants, but
a shortage of high quality applicants. When a worker does not know if she will be in
the long or short side of the market, she may find early offers made by low quality firms
attractive. For such firms, early offers is the only way to employ high quality workers.
Ha laburda (2010) proposes that the key to explaining unraveling is the similarity of
firms’ preferences. Workers’ preferences for firms are identical, and known from the start,
but firms learn their preferences for workers in the second period. If firms’ preferences
are similar, then firms tend to prefer the same workers. Thus, worse firms may have
better chances to hire their most preferred candidates if they make early offers. So, if
firms’ preferences are sufficiently similar, it is likely that some firms will go early. In
our model, although preferences are identical, this feature does not explain unraveling.
An agent may be concerned about being one of the worst agents in the market, but she
would still prefer to wait and contract in the second period. Early contracting in our
model is inefficient for every agent. As we show below, the strategic uncertainty over how
many other hospitals go early is the main mechanism behind incentives for some agents
to match early.
2 The model and results
We present a model of one-to-one matching between workers and firms. In our model we
adopt the language of the medical interns market, and call the workers doctors, and the
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firms hospitals.
Let H and D be two finite and disjoint sets: H is the set of hospitals, and D the set
of doctors. Suppose that |H| = |D| = n, so we can identify H and D with (copies) of
{1, . . . , n}.
A matching is a function µ : H ∪D → H ∪D such that, for all h ∈ H and d ∈ D,
1. µ(h) ∈ D ∪ {h} and µ(d) ∈ H ∪ {d}
2. d = µ(h) if and only if h = µ(d).
The meaning of µ(h) = h is that the position of hospital h remains unfilled, and µ(d) = d
means that doctor d does not find a job.
Each doctor d and hospital h is assigned a quality
piD(d) ∈ {1, . . . , n} and piH(h) ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Suppose that piH and piD are permutations of {1, . . . , n}, so we can think of quality as
the rank of a hospital or doctor in the market. The highest-ranked hospital is h such
that piH(h) = n, for example. If doctor d is hired by hospital h, then they obtain utilities
that depend on their qualities, ud(pi
D(d), piH(h)) is the utility to d and uh(pi
D(d), piH(h))
is the utility to h. If an agent remains unmatched, then she obtains a utility of zero.
A matching µ is stable if there is no pair (h, d) such that
ud(pi
D(d), piH(h)) > ud(pi
D(d), piH(µ(d))) and uh(pi
D(d), piH(h)) > uh(pi
D(µ(h)), piH(h)).
We assume that ud and uh are multiplicative; that is: ud(i, j) = uh(i, j) = ij.
Remark 1. There is a unique stable matching, the matching µ(i) = i (the identity match-
ing).
2.1 Matching over time: early or late offers
We present a stylized description of matching over time. There are two periods. In the
first period, players do not know permutations piH and piD, and hospitals can make offers
to doctors. When an offer is accepted, the hospital and the doctor exit the job market.
In the second period, a pair of permutations piH and piD is drawn at random, uniformly
and independently. All agents are informed of the draw. In period t = 1, hospitals that
did not exit the market make offers to the remaining doctors.
We shall focus on the strategic motivations for going early: we study the simultaneous-
move game in which hospitals decide, at time t = 0 whether to go early and match at
time t = 0, or to wait and match at time t = 1. In particular, we assume that only
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hospitals are strategic and that matchings are automatic. In period t = 1 the matching
is assortative among the agents who have not matched in period t = 0. In period t = 0,
matching is random because no agent has any information on match qualities.
In Section 2.4 we present results where both doctors and hospitals are strategic. Our
results essentially go through.2
Each agent i ∈ H ∪ D has a discount factor δi. The utility at t = 0 when h and d
match in period t is given by
δthuh(pi
D(d), piH(h)) = δthpi
D(d)piH(h), and
δtdud(pi
D(d), piH(h)) = δtdpi
D(d)piH(h),
to h and d, respectively.
The following timeline describes how events unfold.
δi drawn t = 0 offers pi realized t = 1 offers
If hospital h makes an offer in period 0 then it matches to a doctor of random quality.
Since the hospital does not know its own quality either, when a early offer is accepted,
both the hospital and the doctor may be of any quality. The expected utility of making
an offer in period 0 is therefore
Ue = 1
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ij.
In period 1, the agents have learned the values of piD and piH , so the matching will
be assortative, meaning that the doctor with the highest value of piD(d) will match with
the hospital with the highest value of piH(h), the doctor with the next-highest value of
piD(d) will match with the hospital with the next-highest value of piH(h), and so on.
If all other hospitals wait to make offers in period t = 1, then the expected utility to
hospital h, in period 0, of waiting for period 1 is
δh
1
n
n∑
i=1
i2.
2The discussion in Roth (1984) suggests that the model where only hospitals are strategic is the more
realistic model. We actually use the results in this section to prove the result in Section 2.4, so to us the
model in which only hospitals are strategic is a methodological first step.
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In general, if h decides to wait and make an offer in t = 1, then some hospitals may
have made early offers and left the market with their corresponding doctors. Suppose
that m hospitals go early. The matching between the remaining agents will be assortative,
but which hospitals match with which doctors depends on the realized qualities of the
agents that are left in the market in period 1.
We write Um for the expected value of piH(h)piD(µ˜(h)), where µ˜ is the (random)
assortative matching in period 1 when m hospitals (with their respective doctors) have
left the market in period 0. That is, when m hospitals exit the market at t = 0, Um is the
expected utility to a hospital of waiting for t = 1. Note that piH(h)piD(µ˜(h)) depends on
the realized qualities of the m hospitals and m doctors that left the market at t = 0, and
also on the quality to which a hospital may be assigned to. The following is an important
technical result in our paper.
Lemma 1.
Um = (n+ 1)
2(2(n−m) + 1)
6(n−m+ 1) .
Section 4 gives a precise definition of the quantity Um and presents a proof of Lemma 1.
Note that U0 is the expected utility of waiting for period 1 if all other hospitals wait to
make offers in period t = 1, that is: U0 = 1n
∑n
i=1 i
2.
2.2 Incomplete information
We are now in a position to define a Bayesian normal-form game that captures the idea
that hospitals in this model make early offer due to the strategic uncertainty over how
many other hospitals go early.
We assume that δh ∈ [0, 1] is the private information of hospital h. The type of an
agent h is therefore δh. All agents share the prior that the different δh are drawn indepen-
dently from a distribution over [0, 1] with cumulative distribution function (cdf) F . We
assume that x ≤ F (x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]: the assumption is satisfied for any distribution
with a concave cdf. For example the uniform, or truncated normal, distributions on [0, 1]
satisfy our assumption.
A strategy for a hospital h is a function
sh : [0, 1]→ {0, 1},
where sh(δh) is the period in which hospital h makes its offer. In our model, there is no
decision to be made other than when to match.
Given a profile of strategies s = (s1, . . . , sn), we write s−h for the profile of strategies
of hospitals other than h. Given a profile s−h, for each realization of δ−h, s−h determines
m, the number of hospitals that go early. Thus, s−h defines a probability distribution
for m. We write Es−hUm for the expected value of Um given s−h (see Lemma 1). Then,
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δhEs−hUm is the expected utility at time 0, to hospital h, of waiting for t = 1 to make an
offer, if all hospitals other than h have the profile of strategies s−h. In particular, note
that Es−hUm =
∑n−1
i=0 Pr(m = i)Ui, where Pr(m = i) is defined by s−h (and is calculated
using the cdf F ).
Given a profile s−h, a hospital h will decide to go early if and only if
Ue ≥ δhEs−hUm (1)
(recall that Ue is the expected utility of making an early offer).
A profile of strategies s = (s1, . . . , sn) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) if (1) is
satisfied for each h ∈ H. A BNE is symmetric if sh = sh′ for all h, h′ ∈ H. A BNE is full
unraveling if sh(δh) = 0 for all h ∈ H.
Theorem 1. If n ≤ 10 then the unique symmetric BNE is the full unraveling BNE. If
n > 10 then there is at least one symmetric BNE, namely the full unraveling BNE, and
in any symmetric BNE s = (s1, . . . , sn) for every h ∈ H we have that
Pr(sh = 0) ≥ F (3/4) ≥ 3/4.
Theorem 1 says that any hospital, in any symmetric BNE, is more likely to go early
than to late. The equilibrium probability of going early is at least 3/4. It is therefore
immediate that:
Corollary 1. In any symmetric BNE, the expected number of hospitals that go early is
at least nF (3/4) ≥ n3/4.
2.3 Stability of BNE – Uniform F
We make an additional assumption. We suppose that the prior distribution F is the
uniform cdf. In this case, we can make more precise statements about the set of BNE in
our game. We can also talk about the stability of equilibria.
For large n, in the unique stable equilibrium, the market is segmented. Most of the
market (3/4 of all hospitals) go early, while the rest wait and contract late. Thus our
results with a uniform F can explain some of the empirical findings where only part of
the market unravels.
Theorem 2. Let F be the uniform cdf. If n ≤ 10 then the unique symmetric BNE is the
full unraveling BNE. If n > 10 then there are exactly two symmetric BNE. One is the
full unraveling BNE. The second is a BNE sn = (sn1 , . . . , s
n
n) in which for every h ∈ H
Pr(snh = 0) ≥ 3/4 = lim
n→∞
Pr(snh = 0).
Remark 2. The proof of Theorem 1 actually follows from Theorem 2. We lay out the
details in Section 6.
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We discuss a notion of stability of BNE. Stability allows us to select a symmetric BNE
in the cases in which there is more than one. It turns out that the full unraveling BNE is
stable when n ≤ 10 and the equilibrium denoted by sn in Theorem 2 is the unique stable
symmetric BNE when n > 10.
A strategy sh satisfying Equation (1) is characterized by a threshold δ¯h ∈ [0, 1] such
that sh(δh) = 0 if δh ≤ δ¯h and sh(δh) = 1 if δh > δ¯h.3 Given identical thresholds δ¯−h = δ¯
for all hospitals other than h, we can let βn(δ¯) be the threshold for hospital h defined by
Equation (1).
A symmetric BNE is then described by a single δ¯ ∈ [0, 1] with the property that
δ¯ = βn(δ¯).
The function βn is the best-response function of our game. The symmetric BNE are
the fixed points of βn. The following figure shows the graph of βn for n = 3, 7, 11, 15, 17.
Figure 1: The graph of βn for n = 3, 7, 11, 15, 17.
A symmetric BNE δ¯ is stable if there is an open interval I of δ¯ in [0, 1] such that for
all δ ∈ I
1. δ < βn(δ) when δ < δ¯, and
2. δ > βn(δ) when δ > δ¯.
A symmetric BNE that is not stable is unstable.
It is easy to see from Figure 1 that the full unraveling BNE is stable when it is
unique, but for larger n, we have two BNE, and the smaller BNE is stable, while the full
unraveling BNE is unstable. This holds more generally:
3Specifically, δ¯h =
Ue
Es−hUm
. Then, δh ≤ δ¯h if and only if Ue ≥ δhEs−hUm if and only if sh(δh) = 0.
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Proposition 1. Let F be the uniform cdf. If n ≤ 10 then the full unraveling BNE is
stable. If n > 10 then the symmetric BNE denoted by sn in Theorem 2 is stable while the
full unraveling BNE is unstable.
2.4 Strategic doctors
We now assume that doctors are strategic as well. We consider the simultaneous-move
game in which the players are H ∪ D. Each agent has to decide whether to match in
period t = 0 or t = 1. So the set of available actions is {0, 1} to each player. Agents’
strategies are functions si : [0, 1]→ {0, 1}.
When doctors are strategic, the probability that m agents go early is the probability
that the minimum between the hospitals and the doctors that make offers at period 0,
equals m. For any profile of strategies s, and any realization (δi) of types, the number of
agents who exit the market is the minimum of two quantities, the number of hospitals h
with sh(δh) = 0, and the number of doctors d with sd(δd) = 0.
Thus, given a profile of strategies of all agents other than h, the expected value of
Um, Es−hUm, involves the probability distribution of the minimum of two independent
binomial random variables, instead of a single binomial random variable as in the previous
case. The number m is drawn according to the minimum of two binomial distributions.
The calculations performed in the proof of Theorem 1 are still sufficient to give us
the following result.
Theorem 3. There is at least one symmetric BNE, namely the full unraveling BNE. In
any symmetric BNE s = (si)i∈H∪D, for every i ∈ H ∪D we have that
Pr(si = 0) ≥ F (1/2) ≥ 1/2.
Corollary 2. In any symmetric BNE, the expected number of agents that go early is at
least nF (1/2) ≥ n/2.
The results in Section 2.3 extend to the case when doctors are strategic. We obtain
the following result.
Theorem 4. Let F be the uniform cdf. If n > 10, then there are exactly two symmetric
BNE. One is the full unraveling BNE, which is unstable. The second is a stable BNE
s = (si)i∈H∪D such that Pr(si = 0) ≥ 1/2 for every i ∈ H ∪D.
3 A discussion of our model
Our model has a number of specific assumptions that merit some discussion.
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First, we assume that payoffs are multiplicative. 4 A parametric assumption about
payoffs is unavoidable when we are trying to precisely calculate the probability that an
agent will go early (although, as the proof of Lemma 1 attests, the calculation is not
simple). The multiplicative assumption also makes sense as a way of abstracting from
other possible explanations of unraveling.
We did not want an explanation of unraveling that was based on the insurance value of
going early (an avenue explored by Li and Rosen (1998)). We assumed payoffs for which
there is a clear advantage to going late, not early. In our model, agents are risk neutral,
and even though an agent may end up with a low quality, there is not enough insurance
in going early to compensate from the gain in efficiency from a late assortative matching.
The multiplicative model implies that, even though an agent may be concerned about a
bad draw of their quality, the gains from matching assortatively outweigh the temptation
to match to an average partner in t = 0.
Roth (1984) suggests that unraveling is the result of a prisoners’ dilemma game among
the hospitals. The implication is that it is a dominant strategy for the hospitals to
go early. Our focus is on the strategic channel, whereby agents go early because of
their concerns that others go early (and the consequence negative externality). By our
assumptions on preferences, we rule out that it is dominant for agents to go early.
It is still possible to generate unraveling by way of a coordination failure, as in the
literature on bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In our model, however, and in
contrast to the model of bank runs, such unraveling is unstable. Only when all agents
are certain that all other agents want to go early, are they willing to go early. It is easy
to rule out such an outcome if agents’ beliefs may depart from certainty that everyone
goes early. In contrast, we show that there is in our model a stable equilibrium in which
agents are more likely to go early than to go late. Coordination failure is still present in
that equilibrium, but unraveling arises through the channel of strategic unraveling.
Finally, the multiplicative model also captures very nicely the negative externality
imposed by agents who go early on the rest of the market. There is an efficiency loss
when some agents go early; they hurt the rest of the agents (even in a model without
transfers like ours).
The second assumption that deserves mention is our informational assumption. We
assume that agents are completely ignorant about match qualities at date t = 0. The
assumption is extreme, and it is meant to focus the model on the tradeoff between the
value of the information revealed at t = 1, and the incentives to go early. By assuming
that there is no information at time t = 0, and full information at t = 1, we have biased
the model against the unraveling outcome.
That said, it may not be an unrealistic assumption. From Roth and Xing (1994):
“offers are being made so early that there are serious difficulties in distinguishing among
4This is a common assumption in applied matching theory; see e.g. Bulow and Levin (2006), Damiano,
Li, and Suen (2005), and many other papers.
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the candidates.” So our assumption of complete ignorance over match qualities may
reflect the actual situation in the markets where we observe unraveling.
4 Proof of Lemma 1
In this Section we present, in the first place, a formula for U1 which clarifies the meaning
of this important quantity. Then, a algorithm to compute Um in the general case is
introduced (Proposition 2). Lemmas 2 and 3, deduce a simple formula for Um.
Recall that U0 is the expected utility from waiting when all other hospitals wait.
Then:
U0 = 1
n
n∑
i=1
i2 =
(n+ 1)(2n+ 1)
6
.
4.1 Computing U1
We compute the expected utility from waiting, when only one hospital goes early. In
period 1, after permutations piH and piD is drawn, sets H and D can be ordered according
to agents’ quality. Then, consider the sets H and D described as: H = {1, 2, . . . , n} and
D = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
First, conditional on being of quality i, the leaving hospital is a higher type than i
with probability (n− i)/(n− 1), and a lower type than i with probability (i− 1)/(n− 1).
This is deduced from the fact that there are n− 1 possible qualities for the hospital that
leaves early, (n − i) of those are higher than i and (i − 1) lower than i. The following
figure may help to make the computations.
If the leaving hospital is of a higher quality than i, this means that hospital i is better
off, unless the doctor that leaves with hospital i is also a “good” doctor: unless the doctor
that leaves is one that would be matched in the second period with a hospital better than
i. This happens with probability (n − i)/n. With the complementary probability, i/n,
hospital i is better off by the better hospital leaving. Being better off means that hospital
i will be matched in the second period with a doctor with a quality one unit higher than
i (i.e., a doctor of quality (i+ 1)), which is worth i to a hospital of type i.
If the leaving hospital is of a lower quality than i, then this does not affect hospital
i and it gets i2; unless the doctor that leaves used to be with a better hospital, or with
i, in which case hospital i goes down one step. To a hospital of quality i, losing one
step is worth −i. So in the event that a hospital of lower type than i leaves (which has
probability (i−1)/(n−1)) it gets i2 for sure but it loses −i with probability (n− i+1)/n,
the probability that the partner of the hospital that goes early is of quality greater than
or equal to i.
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Figure 2: Computing U1
So:
U1 = 1
n
n∑
i=1
{
n− i
n− 1
[
i2 +
i
n
i
]
+
i− 1
n− 1
[
i2 − n− i+ 1
n
i
]}
.
Since the terms that multiply i2 add to 1, this gives:
U1 = 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
i2 +
i
n(n− 1) (n− 2i+ 1)
]
=
(2n− 1)(n+ 1)2
6n
.
Note that U1 can be also expressed as:
U1 = U0 + 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
(n− i)
(n− 1)
i
n
i− (i− 1)
(n− 1)
(n− i+ 1)
n
i
]
.
The intuition behind this equation is the following. Notice that with probability
(n−i)/(n−1) the hospital that leaves early is of higher quality than i and with probability
(i− 1)/(n− 1) is of lower quality than i. Then, ((n− i)/(n− 1))(i/n) is the probability
that the hospital that leaves early is of quality higher than i and the doctor it hires is of
quality lower than or equal to i. In this event, hospital i increases its utility by i. If the
hospital that goes early is of quality lower than i and it hires a doctor of quality higher
than or equal to i, which happens with probability ((i− 1)/(n− 1))((n− i+ 1)/n), then
hospital i decreases its utility by i. Therefore, U1 can be expressed as U0 plus the “net”
expected utility derived from the leaving of a pair of hospital-doctor.
Clearly, this argument is very hard to generalize if we consider more than one hos-
pital that goes early. In the following Section, we develop an algorithm to compute the
expected utility from waiting, when m pairs of hospital-doctor leave the market at t = 0.
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4.2 An algorithm to compute Um
In this section, we introduce an algorithm to compute the value of Um in the general
case. First, we define the payoff matrix U as follows: the element (i, j) of U is the utility
that a doctor of quality i has when she is hired by a hospital of quality j (which is also
the utility of the hospital). In particular, the elements of the first column of U are the
utilities that the hospital of quality 1 has if it hires a doctor of quality 1, 2, . . . , n. Note
that the elements of the main diagonal of U are: 1, 4, . . . , i2, . . . , n2, which are the payoffs
that each agent has when no pair of hospital-doctor leaves early. Thus, matrix U is:

1 2 3 . . . (n− 1) n
2 4 6 . . . 2(n− 1) 2n
3 6 9 . . . 3(n− 1) 3n
.
.
.
(n− 1) 2(n− 1) 3(n− 1) . . . (n− 1)2 n(n− 1)
n 2n 3n . . . n(n− 1) n2

.
When a hospital makes an offer at t = 0 and hires a doctor, both the hospital and the
doctor may be of any quality. So, to compute the expected utility we have to consider
all possible qualities combinations. Assume that the hospital that leaves is of quality
j and the doctor that it hires is of quality i. If only this pair of hospital-doctor leaves
the market at t = 0, in the second period the utilities of hospitals and doctors that do
not leave the market are given by the assortative matching. Indeed, the highest quality
hospital (between those that remain in the market) will hire the highest quality doctor
of those that do not exit the market. The same argument holds for all agents.
Therefore, when doctor i is hired at t = 0 by hospital j, the utilities of hospitals and
doctors that remain in the market in the second period, are the elements of the main
diagonal of the submatrix of U that it is obtained from deleting the row i and the column
j. To consider all possible combinations for the quality of the hospital that leaves early
and the doctor that it hires, we have to go over all the elements of U. For each of these
cases, there are n − 1 possible qualities that a hospital that waits may be assigned to
in the second period. Thus, to compute the expected utility from waiting when only
one pair of hospital-doctor leaves at t = 0, we have to compute all the submatrices of U
obtained by deleting one row and one column, for each one of these submatrices we find
its trace, we sum all these traces and, finally, we have to divide the sum by n2(n − 1),
since there are n2 possible pairs of qualities for the hospital and the doctor that go early.
If m hospitals make an offer at t = 0, we generalize the previous argument as follows.
Consider all submatrices of U that result when m rows and m columns are deleted.
There are
(
n
m
)(
n
m
)
submatrices that can be found. In each case, there are (n−m) possible
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qualities for a hospital that waits. Thus, for each submatrix, compute its trace. Um is the
sum of all the computed traces after dividing it by
(
n
m
)(
n
m
)
(n−m) = n2(n−1)2...(n−m+1)2
(m!)2
(n−
m).
The following proposition states this result.5
Proposition 2. Let Um be expected utility to a hospital of waiting for the second period
when m hospitals (with their respective doctors) have left the market at t = 0. Denote by
T (n,m) the sum of the traces of all submatrices of U when m rows and m columns are
deleted. Then:
Um = T (n,m)(m!)
2
n2(n− 1)2 . . . (n−m+ 1)2
1
(n−m) .
To come up with an expression for Um, the next step involves the computation of
T (n,m). The following lemma finds a formula for T (n,m). Then, we obtain a reduced
expression of the formula by means of some combinatorial identities.
Lemma 2. Denote by T (n,m) the sum of the traces of all submatrices of U obtained by
deleting m rows and m columns. Then:
T (n,m) =
n∑
i=1
[
i2
m∑
k=0
((
i− 1
k
)(
n− i
m− k
))2]
+
2
m∑
j=1
[
n−j∑
i=1
i(i+ j)
(
m∑
k=j
(
i+ j − 1
k
)(
n− (i+ j)
m− k
)(
n− i
m− k + j
)(
i− 1
k − j
))]
.
Proof. First we consider the elements of the main diagonal of U and second, the remaining
elements.
(ii)-elements
Consider an element ii of the matrix and suppose we delete m rows and m columns.
Note that there are i− 1 rows (columns) above (at the left of) the element ii and n− i
rows below (at the right). When we delete columns and rows, the element ii remains in
the main diagonal if the number of rows that are deleted above ii is equal to the number
of columns that are deleted from the left of ii. That is, if we delete k rows above ii and
m−k rows below, then we have to delete k columns at the left and m−k columns at the
right. Thus, the number of submatrices in which the element ii is in the main diagonal
is:
m∑
k=0
((
i− 1
k
)(
n− i
m− k
))2
.
5The algorithm can be also applied with other functions uh and ud whenever the functions are strictly
supermodular on the lattice {1, 2, . . . , n}2.
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Since the element ii in the matrix is i2, the share of T (n,m) that corresponds to the
elements of the main diagonal of U is:
n∑
i=1
[
i2
m∑
k=0
((
i− 1
k
)(
n− i
m− k
))2]
.
(ij)-elements
Since U is a symmetric matrix, the trace of the submatrix that we obtain by deleting
rows i1, i2, . . . , im and columns j1, j2, . . . , jm is equal to the trace of the submatrix ob-
tained by deleting rows j1, j2, . . . , jm and columns i1, i2, . . . , im. Thus, we only have to
consider the elements i(i+ j) for j > 0, and take two times the final result. In particular,
when only one row and one column are deleted, the elements that will be in the main
diagonal of some submatrix are those of the form i(i+ j) for i = 1, . . . , n− 1 and j = 1.
When two rows and two columns are deleted, the elements to be considered in T (n,m)
are the previous elements and those of the form i(i + j) for i = 1, . . . , n − 2 and j = 2.
In general, when m rows and m columns are deleted we have to consider all the elements
that were contemplated when m− 1 rows and m− 1 columns were deleted, and those of
the form i(i+ j) for i = 1, . . . , n−m and j = m.
As we just noted, when we delete m rows and m columns, the elements that are in the
trace of some submatrix are those of the form i(i+ j) with j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. So, consider
an element i(i+ j). This element has i− 1 rows above and n− i below. Moreover, it has
i + j − 1 columns at the left and n− (i + j) columns at the right. Suppose we delete k
columns at the left of i(i+ j) and m− (i+ j) at the right. Now the element is in column
i+j−k. In order to be in the main diagonal of a submatrix, it should be that: j−k ≤ 0.
Moreover, we have to delete k− j rows above the element i(i+ j) to guaranteed that the
element is in the main diagonal of the submatrix.
Then, the share of T (n,m) that corresponds to these elements is:
2
m∑
j=1
[
n−j∑
i=1
i(i+ j)
(
m∑
k=j
(
i+ j − 1
k
)(
n− (i+ j)
m− k
)(
i− 1
k − j
)(
n− i
m− (k − j)
))]
.
Lemma 3. For n ∈ N and m ∈ 1, 2, . . . , n− 1 it holds that:
T (n,m) =
(
n+ 1
m
)2(n−m∑
i=1
i2
)
.
The following proof was provided to us by Doron Zeilberger.
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Proof. The proof is organized in five claims.
Claim 1: T (n,m) can be written as:∑
i,j,k
i(i+ j)
(
i+ j − 1
k
)(
n− (i+ j)
m− k
)(
n− i
m− k + j
)(
i− 1
k − j
)
,
where the summation range is over all triples (i, j, k), with the convention that the
binomial coefficient
(
r
s
)
is zero if it is not the case that 0 ≤ s ≤ r.
Proof Claim 1
In the proof of the last lemma we found an expression for T (n,m) using the symmetry
of the matrix U. If we do not use the symmetry we obtain the following equivalent
expression:
T (n,m) =
n∑
i=1
[
i2
m∑
k=0
((
i− 1
m− k
)(
n− i
k
))2]
+
m∑
j=1
[
n−j∑
i=1
i(i+ j)
(
m∑
k=j
(
i+ j − 1
k
)(
n− (i+ j)
m− k
)(
n− i
m− k + j
)(
i− 1
k − j
))]
+
m∑
i=1
[
n−i∑
j=1
j(i+ j)
(
m∑
k=i
(
i+ j − 1
k
)(
n− (i+ j)
m− k
)(
n− j
m− k + i
)(
j − 1
k − i
))]
.
Note that for each j = 1, . . . ,m, the range for i is 1 ≤ i ≤ n−j, and for each i = 1, . . . ,m,
the range for j is 1 ≤ j ≤ n − i. Thus, we can write these conditions as: 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
1 ≤ j ≤ n and 1 ≤ i+ j ≤ n. Now, consider the sum:∑
i,j,k
i(i+ j)
(
i+ j − 1
k
)(
n− (i+ j)
m− k
)(
n− i
m− k + j
)(
i− 1
k − j
)
.
The implicit range for each variable is: j ≤ k ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ n and
1 ≤ i+ j ≤ n. This implies that both sums are equal.
Claim 2: The sum of Claim 1 equals:
n∑
a=1
a
min(a−1,m)∑
k=max(0,a−(n−m))
(
a− 1
k
)(
n− a
m− k
) a−k+m∑
i=a−k
i
(
n− i
m− k + a− i
)(
i− 1
k − a+ i
)
.
Proof Claim 2
Writing a = i + j, (and leaving i as a discrete variable, but letting j = a − i), the
sum of the last claim is equal to:∑
a,k,i
ia
(
a− 1
k
)(
n− a
m− k
)(
n− i
m− k + a− i
)(
i− 1
k − a+ i
)
.
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Note that summation range of each variable is defined by:
1. For a: 1 ≤ a ≤ n.
2. For k: 0 ≤ k ≤ m, 0 ≤ m− k + a− i ≤ n− i and 0 ≤ k ≤ a− 1. This implies that
max(0, a− (n−m)) ≤ k ≤ min(a− 1,m).
3. For i: 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ m − k + a − i and 0 ≤ k − a + i. This implies that
a− k ≤ i ≤ m− k + a.
Then, the last sum equals the iterated summation:
n∑
a=1
min(a−1,m)∑
k=max(0,a−(n−m))
a−k+m∑
i=a−k
ia
(
a− 1
k
)(
n− a
m− k
)(
n− i
m− k + a− i
)(
i− 1
k − a+ i
)
.
Which is equivalent to:
n∑
a=1
a
min(a−1,m)∑
k=max(0,a−(n−m))
(
a− 1
k
)(
n− a
m− k
) a−k+m∑
i=a−k
i
(
n− i
m− k + a− i
)(
i− 1
k − a+ i
)
.
Claim 3: The innermost sum is:
a−k+m∑
i=a−k
i
(
n− i
m− k + a− i
)(
i− 1
k − a+ i
)
= (a− k)
(
n+ 1
m
)
.
Proof Claim 3
First note that: i
(
i−1
k−a+i
)
= (a− k)( i
a−k
)
. Then we have:
a−k+m∑
i=a−k
i
(
n− i
m− k + a− i
)(
i− 1
k − a+ i
)
= (a− k)
a−k+m∑
i=a−k
(
n− i
m− k + a− i
)(
i
a− k
)
.
Now, notice that:
a−k+m∑
i=a−k
(
n− i
m− k + a− i
)(
i
a− k
)
=
m∑
i=0
(
n− (a− k + i)
m− i
)(
a− k + i
a− k
)
.
Since
(
a−k+i
a−k
)
=
(
a−k+i
i
)
, the last sum can be written as:
m∑
i=0
(
n− (a− k + i)
m− i
)(
a− k + i
i
)
.
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Which is equal to:
m∑
i=0
(
(n−m− a+ k) +m− i
m− i
)(
a− k + i
i
)
.
Finally, we use the Vandermonde-Chu identity (Sprugnoli (Sprugnoli, 2012), page 54):
n∑
k=0
(
x+ k
k
)(
y + n− k
n− k
)
=
(
x+ y + n+ 1
n
)
.
Defining x = a− k and y = (n−m− a+ k), we have:
m∑
i=0
(
(n−m− a+ k) +m− i
m− i
)(
a− k + i
i
)
=
(
x+ y + n+ 1
n
)
=
(
n+ 1
m
)
.
Claim 4: For the middle sum it holds that:
min(a−1,m)∑
k=max(0,a−(n−m))
(a− k)
(
a− 1
k
)(
n− a
m− k
)
= a
(
n− 1
m
)
− (a− 1)
(
n− 2
m− 1
)
.
Proof Claim 4
First, we divide the sum:
min(a−1,m)∑
k=max(0,a−(n−m))
(a− k)
(
a− 1
k
)(
n− a
m− k
)
= a
min(a−1,m)∑
k=max(0,a−(n−m))
(
a− 1
k
)(
n− a
m− k
)
−
min(a−1,m)∑
k=max(0,a−(n−m))
k
(
a− 1
k
)(
n− a
m− k
)
.
We use the Vandermonde-Chu identity (Sprugnoli (Sprugnoli, 2012), page 53):
n∑
k=0
(
x
k
)(
y
n− k
)
=
(
x+ y
n
)
.
And the first sum is:6
a
min(a−1,m)∑
k=max(0,a−(n−m))
(
a− 1
k
)(
n− a
m− k
)
= a
(
n− 1
m
)
.
6Note that max(0, a − (n −m)) = 0. Indeed, if (a − (n −m)) > 0, we have n − a −m − k < 0 and
thus,
(
n−a
m−k
)
= 0. Also, we can write the sum up to k = m, because for k = a, a+ 1, . . . ,m,
(
a−1
k
)
= 0.
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In the second sum if we replace k
(
a−1
k
)
= (a− 1)(a−2
k−1
)
, we have:
(a− 1)
min(a−1,m)∑
k=max(0,a−(n−m))
(
a− 2
k − 1
)(
n− a
m− k
)
,
which is equal to:
(a− 1)
m∑
k=0
(
a− 2
m− 1− k
)(
n− a
k
)
.
By the Vandermonde-Chu identity, the sum is:
(a− 1)
(
n− 2
m− 1
)
.
Claim 5: Finally, we have:
T (n,m) =
(
n+ 1
m
)2(n−m∑
i=1
i2
)
.
Proof Claim 5
Since the last claims we know that:
T (n,m) =
(
n+ 1
m
)((
n− 1
m
)( n∑
a=1
a2
)
−
(
n− 2
m− 1
)( n∑
a=1
a(a− 1)
))
.
Then, compute:(
n+ 1
m
)((
n− 1
m
)( n∑
a=1
a2
)
−
(
n− 2
m− 1
)( n∑
a=1
a(a− 1)
))
=
(
n+ 1
m
)(
(n− 1)!
m!(n−m− 1)!
n(n+ 1)(2n+ 1)
6
− (n− 2)!
(m− 1)!(n−m− 1)!
(n− 1)n(n+ 1)
3
)
=
(
n+ 1
m
) (
(n+ 1)!
m!(n−m− 1)!
(2n+ 1)
6
− (n+ 1)!
m!(n−m− 1)!
m
3
)
=
(
n+ 1
m
)
(n+ 1)!
m!(n−m− 1)!
(
2n+ 1
6
− m
3
)
=
(
n+ 1
m
)
(n+ 1)!
m!(n−m− 1)!
2n− 2m+ 1
6
=
(
n+ 1
m
)
(n+ 1)!
m!(n−m+ 1)!
(n−m)(n−m+ 1)(2n− 2m+ 1)
6
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=(
n+ 1
m
)2
(n−m)(n−m+ 1)(2(n−m) + 1)
6
=
(
n+ 1
m
)2 n−m∑
i=1
i2 .
Finally, we obtain the formula for Um. We know that:
Um = T (n,m)(n
m
)(
n
m
)
(n−m) .
First note that: (
n+ 1
m
)2
=
[
n+ 1
n−m+ 1
]2(
n
m
)2
.
Then, replacing the last expression in Um, we obtain:
Um = (n+ 1)
2
(n−m+ 1)2(n−m)
(n−m)(n−m+ 1)(2(n−m) + 1)
6
.
By simplifying the last equation, we prove the result:
Um = (n+ 1)
2(2(n−m) + 1)
6(n−m+ 1) .
Note that Um increases with n, the number of agents. This means that if there are
more agents in the market, the incentives to make early offers when a fixed number of
agents leave the market at t = 0, decreases.
The next result shows that Um decreases with m, a property which will be used in
the next Section. Then, the expected utility of waiting and match at t = 1, decreases as
more agents leave early.
Note that Um+1 − Um represents the negative externality imposed by one agent who
decides to go early, when m agents have already decided to match at t = 0. Also,
Um −Um+1 increases when m becomes larger. Then the negative externality imposed by
one more agent going early, increases (in absolute value) as more agents have decided to
go early.
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Corollary 3. Let Um be expected utility of a hospital that decides to wait for the second
period when m pairs of hospital-doctor leave the market at t = 1. Then for n ∈ N and
m = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, we have:
Um − Um+1 = (n+ 1)
2
6(n−m)(n−m+ 1) .
5 Proof of Theorem 2
Recall that the best-response function of our game, βn, is defined by Equation (1) in the
following way. Given identical thresholds δ−h = δ for all hospitals other than h, βn(δ) is
given by the equation:
1
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ij = βn(δ)Es−hUm.
Where s−h is such that sh˜ = 0 if δh˜ ≤ δ and sh˜ = 1 if δh˜ > δ, for all h˜ 6= h.
Note that:
1
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ij =
(n+ 1)2
4
.
When all hospitals other than h have the same threshold δ, the probability that m
hospitals make early offers is the probability m hospitals have discount factors less than
or equal to δ, and n −m hospitals have discount factors higher than δ. Since discount
factors are drawn independently from a uniform distribution on [0, 1], the probability
that m hospitals leave at t = 0 is given by δm(1− δ)n−1−m(n−1
m
)
. Therefore:
Es−hUm =
n−1∑
m=0
δm(1− δ)n−1−m
(
n− 1
m
)
Um.
Then βn is defined by:
βn(δ) =
(n+ 1)2
4
[∑n−1
m=0 δ
m(1− δ)n−1−m(n−1
m
)Um] .
The symmetric BNE of our game are the fixed points of the best-response function
βn. Since Lemma 1 we know that Un−1 = (n+1)24 , and then βn(1) = 1 for all n. Thus, the
full unraveling is a BNE for all n. In this Section we investigate the existence of other
fixed points. In particular, Lemma 4 gives a simple formula for βn. Lemma 6 shows
that βn is an increasing function of δ and βn(0) > 3
4
. Thus, βn may have, at most, one
more fixed point different from δ = 1. Moreover, if it exists, the fixed point is higher
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than 3
4
. Lemma 6 proves that δ = 1 is the unique fixed point of βn for all n ≤ 10, and
if n > 10, βn has exactly two fixed points. Finally, Lemma 8 studies the behavior of βn
when n tends to infinity.
It is worthwhile noting that the threshold at the BNE sn defined in Theorem 1,
decreases as more agents are present in the market. This means that the probability that
a hospital makes early offers, decreases as the number of agents increases. The intuition
of this result is clear since, as we noted before, the incentives to make early offers when
a fixed number of agents leave the market at t = 0, decreases with n.
Lemma 4.
βn(δ) =
3
2
(
2− 1
n(n+ 1)
n∑
m=1
mδn−m
)−1
.
First we will prove the following lemma which will be useful in the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. For any n ∈ N and δ ∈ R it holds:
n∑
m=0
(1− δ)n−mδm(n
m
)
n−m+ 2 =
n∑
m=0
(m+ 1)δn−m
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
.
Proof. 7 Consider the following polynomials of degree n:
p(δ) =
n∑
m=0
(1− δ)n−mδm(n
m
)
n−m+ 2 , and
q(δ) =
n∑
m=0
(m+ 1)δn−m
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
.
We want to prove that p = q and to this end, we will show that all the derivatives
of p and q are equal at δ = 0. Denote by p(k) and q(k) the kth derivative of p and q,
respectively. It is straightforward to show that:
q(k)(δ) =
n−k∑
m=0
1
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
(m+ 1)(n−m)(n−m− 1) . . . (n−m− k + 1)δn−m−k,
for k = 1, 2, . . . , n
Then:
q(k)(δ) =
n−k∑
m=0
1
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
(m+ 1)
(n−m)!
(n−m− k)!δ
n−m−k.
7 We are very grateful to Andre´s Sambarino for helpful comments on this proof.
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When we evaluate at δ = 0, we have:
q(k)(0) =
(n− k + 1)k!
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
.
To compute the kth derivative of p, consider the functions:
g1(δ) = (1− δ)n−m, and
g2(δ) = δ
m.
Then:
g
(i)
1 (δ) =
(n−m)!
(n−m− i)!(−1)
i(1− δ)n−m−i, and
g
(k−i)
2 (δ) =
m!
(m− k + i)!δ
m−(k−i).
Using the general Leibniz rule we have, for k = 1, 2, . . . , n:
(g1g2)
(k)(δ) =
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(n−m)!
(n−m− i)!
m!
(m− k + i)!(−1)
i(1− δ)n−m−iδm−(k−i).
If m−k ≥ 0,m− (k− i) ≥ 0 for all i and thus, (g1g2)(k)(0) = 0 Then, suppose m−k ≤ 0,
we have:
(g1g2)
(k)(0) =
(
k
k −m
)
(n−m)!
(n− k)! m!(−1)
k−m.
Thus, the kth derivative of p is:
p(k)(0) =
n∑
m=0
(
n
m
)
1
(n+ 2−m)
(
k
k −m
)
(n−m)!
(n− k)! (−1)
k−mm! .
As we just noted, when m ≥ k, p(k)(0) = 0, then, we can write the previous summation
from m = 0 to m = k.
We want to prove that p(k)(0) = q(k)(0) for all k = 1, 2, . . . , n; that is:
k∑
m=0
(
n
m
)
1
(n+ 2−m)
(
k
k −m
)
(n−m)!
(n− k)! (−1)
k−mm! =
(n− k + 1)!k!
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
.
Note that: (
n
m
)
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
(n+m− 2) =
(
n+ 2
m
)
(n+ 1−m), and
(
k
k −m
)
(n−m)!
(n− k)! m!
1
(n− k + 1)k! (n+ 1−m) =
(
n+ 1−m
n− k + 1
)
.
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Thus, we have to prove that:
(−1)k
k∑
m=0
(
n+ 2
m
)(
n+ 1−m
n− k + 1
)
(−1)m = 1.
To finish the proof we use the following binomial identity from (Riordan, 1979, page 8):
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
n
k
)(
x− k
r
)
=
(
x− n
r − n
)
=
(
x− n
x− r
)
.
Thus:
(−1)k
k∑
m=0
(
n+ 2
m
)(
n+ 1−m
n− k + 1
)
(−1)m = (−1)k
(−1
k
)
.
Finally, by the Negation rule we have:
(−1
k
)
= (−1)k(1+k−1
k
)
= (−1)k, and then:
(−1)k
k∑
m=0
(
n+ 2
m
)(
n+ 1−m
n− k + 1
)
(−1)m = (−1)2k = 1.
Proof of Lemma 4.
We know that:
βn(δ) =
(n+ 1)2
4
[ n−1∑
m=0
(1− δ)n−1−mδm
(
n− 1
m
)
Um
] , and
Um = (n+ 1)
2(2(n−m) + 1)
6(n−m+ 1) ,
for m = 0, . . . , n− 1.
We will use these two identities:
2(n−m) + 1
n−m+ 1 = 2−
1
n−m+ 1 ,
n−1∑
m=0
(1− δ)n−1−mδm
(
n− 1
m
)
= 1.
Then, substituting Um and using the last identities we have:
βn(δ) =
3
2
(
2−
n−1∑
m=0
(1− δ)n−1−mδm(n−1
m
)
n−m+ 1
) .
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By the previous lemma we can write βn as:
βn(δ) =
3
2
(
2−
n−1∑
m=0
(m+ 1)
n(n+ 1)
δn−1−m
) .
Which is equivalent to:
βn(δ) =
3
2
(
2− 1
n(n+ 1)
n∑
m=1
mδn−m
) .
The following lemma gives more information on the nature of βn.
Lemma 6.
βn(δ) =

3
2
[
2− 1
n(n+ 1)
(
δn+1 − nδ2 + (n− 1)δ
(1− δ)2
)] if δ ∈ (0, 1)
1 if δ = 1
Further,
1. βn is increasing for each n.
2. βn(0) > 3
4
and βn(1) = 1, for all n.
3. βn has, at most, two fixed points. δ = 1 is a fixed point of βn for all n ∈ N and it
may have another fixed point which is higher than 3
4
.
Proof. When δ = 1 we have:
βn(1) =
3
2
(
2− 1
n(n+ 1)
n∑
m=1
m
) = 3
2
(
2− 1
n(n+ 1)
n(n+ 1)
2
) = 1.
Then, suppose δ ∈ (0, 1), and note that:
n∑
m=1
mδn−m = δn
n∑
m=1
m
(1
δ
)m
.
We use the following identity, that hold for x 6= 1:
n∑
m=1
mxm =
1− nxn + (n− 1)xn+1
(1− x)2 .
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Finally, for δ ∈ (0, 1) we have:
n∑
m=1
mδn−m =
δn+1 − nδ2 + (n− 1)δ
(1− δ)2 .
To prove part 1, note that for all δ ∈ [0, 1]:(
n∑
m=1
mδn−m
)′
=
n−1∑
m=1
m(n−m)δn−m−1 ≥ 0.
Then, the expression
∑n
m=1mδ
n−m increases with δ and thus, βn is increasing.
For part 2 notice that βn(0) = 3(n+1)
2(2n+1)
> 3
4
for all n ≥ 1.
To prove part 3, we know that δ = 1 is a fixed point of βn. Since βn(0) > 3
4
, βn
crosses the line y = x at, at most, one more point different from δ = 1. Moreover, since
βn(0) > 3
4
and βn is increasing, if it exists, the second fixed point is higher than 3
4
.
Lemma 7. Consider the best-response function βn. Then:
1. For each δ ∈ [0, 1] it holds that βn(δ) ≥ βn+1(δ).
2. For all n ≤ 10, δ = 1 is the unique fixed point of βn.
3. For all n > 10, βn has two and only two fixed points.
Proof. (1) We will show that:
1
n(n+ 1)
[
δn+1 − nδ2 + (n− 1)δ
(1− δ)2
]
≥ 1
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
[
δn+2 − (n+ 1)δ2 + nδ
(1− δ)2
]
.
Which is equivalent to:
δ
n
(δn−1 − n) + n− 1
n
≥ δ
n+ 2
(δn − (n+ 1)) + n
n+ 2
.
Note that:
δ
n
>
δ
n+ 2
,
δn− 1− n > δn − (n+ 1),
and:
n− 1
n
= 1− 1
n
≥ 1− 2
n+ 2
=
n
n+ 2
.
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Thus, we finish the proof.
(2) and (3). We have to study the solutions in [0, 1] of the equation:
βn(δ) =
3
2
(
2− 1
n(n+ 1)
n∑
m=1
mδn−m
) = δ.
Since for each δ ∈ [0, 1] it holds that βn(δ) ≥ βn+1(δ), if βn has two fixed points for
some n0, then β
n has two fixed points for all n such that n ≥ n0. We know that δ = 1 is
one solution of the equation and there may be, at most, one more solution in [0, 1]. The
equation is equivalent to:
pn(δ) = δ
n + δn−1 + 3δn−2 + . . .+ (n− 1)δ2 + (−2n2 − n)δ + 3n(n+ 1)
2
= 0.
As we noted, δ = 1 is a root of pn. We also know that pn(0) =
3n(n+1)
2
> 0 and that
pn has, at most, one more root. Then, we will prove that for some n0, p
′
n0
(1) > 0, which
implies that for all n ≥ n0, pn has two fixed points in [0, 1]. Then, compute:
p′n(1) =
[
n−1∑
i=1
i(n− i+ 1)
]
+ (−2n2 − n) = n(n+ 1)(n− 10)
6
.
Thus, for all n such that 0 ≤ n ≤ 10, p′n(1) ≤ 0 and, for all n > 10, p′n(1) > 0. This
finishes the proof.
5.1 Behavior as n→∞
Lemma 8. For each δ ∈ [0, 1],
lim
n→∞
βn(δ) =
{ 3
4
if δ ∈ [0, 1)
1 if δ = 1
Proof. For δ = 1 we know that βn(1) = 1 for all n. Assume δ < 1. Then, by Lemma 6,
it is enough to show that:
lim
n→+∞
1
n(n+ 1)
[
δn+1 − nδ2 + (n− 1)δt
(1− δ)2
]
= 0.
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The last expression is equivalent to:
δ
(1− δ)2
[
(δ)n
n(n+ 1)
− δ
(n+ 1)
+
n− 1
n(n+ 1)
]
.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that the limit of the last expression when n
tends to infinity is 0.
Note that Lemma 8 implies that the best-response function βn converges to a discon-
tinuous function as n→∞.
Finally, note that in any symmetric BNE the expected number of hospitals that go
early is given by:
n∑
m=0
m(1− δ∗)n−m(δ∗)m
(
n
m
)
Where δ∗ is a fixed point of βn.
The last expression equals nδ∗. As we noted before, βn has, at most, two fixed points,
both higher than 3/4. Thus, in any symmetric BNE, the expected number of hospitals
that go early is at least (3/4)n.
6 Proof of Theorem 1
When all agents share the prior that different δh are drawn independently from a distri-
bution over [0, 1] with cdf F , the best-response function is given by F (βn(x)). Since βn
is an increasing function and F (x) ≥ x, we have that βn(F (x)) ≥ βn(x). Finally, note
that F (1) = 1 and that βn(1) = 1. Then Theorem 1 follows directly from Theorem 2.
7 Proof of Theorem 4
In the case where both sides of the market are strategic, the game is analyzed in the
same way that we did in the previous sections. The difference is that now the probability
that m agents leave early is the probability that the minimum between the hospitals and
the doctors that play at t = 0, equals m. Then, the expected value of Um, involves the
probability distribution of the minimum of two independent binomial random variables.
We introduce some additional notation. Let xm be the probability that a binomial
random variable with parameters (δ, n− 1) equals m, and let hm be the probability that
the minimum of two independent such random variables equals m. Denote by G the
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distribution function of a binomial random variable with parameters (δ, n − 1) and let
G¯ = 1−G. Therefore, the best-response function is defined by
β˜n(δ) =
(n+ 1)2
4
[∑n−1
m=0 hmUm
] .
We use the results of the previous sections to find a lower and upper bound for β˜n. It
is straightforward to prove that 1
2
βn ≤ β˜n ≤ βn. Then, for all n > 10, β˜n has, at least,
one fixed point which lies within the interval (3
8
, 3
4
). Moreover, as we will prove in the
following lemmas, the lower bound can be improved, which allows us to conclude that in
the general model, at least one half of the agents will exit the market early.
We first prove some properties of β˜n. In particular, Lemma 9 shows that: δ = 1 is a
fixed point of β˜n for all n, β˜n is an increasing function of δ, and that β˜n(δ) ≥ β˜n+1(δ)
for all n. Lemma 10 demonstrates that for each  > 0 there exists n0 such that for all
n ≥ n0 it holds:
3
4(
3
2
+ 
) ≤ β˜n(δ) ≤ βn(δ).
Then, limn→∞ β˜n(δ) ≥ 12 , and since β˜ decreases when n increases, we conclude that for
all n:
1
2
≤ β˜n(δ) ≤ βn(δ).
Lemma 9. Consider the best-response function β˜n as defined before. Then:
1. β˜n(1) = 1 for all n.
2. β˜n is an increasing function of δ
3. For each δ ∈ [0, 1], β˜n(δ) ≥ β˜n+1(δ), for all n.
Proof. (1) Since the distribution function of the minimum of two independent binomial
random variables is 1− (1−G)2, we have:
hm = (1− (1−G(m))2)− (1− (1−G(m− 1))2)
= (1−G(m− 1))2 − (1−G(m))2
= 2(G(m)−G(m− 1)) +G(m− 1)2 −G(m)2
= 2xm + (G(m− 1)−G(m))(G(m) +G(m− 1))
= xm(2−G(m− 1)−G(m))
= xm(G¯(m− 1) + G¯(m)).
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Thus,
β˜n(δ) =
(n+ 1)2
4
[∑n−1
m=0(1− δ)n−1−mδm
(
n−1
n
)
(G¯(m− 1) + G¯(m))Um
] .
If we compute β˜n(1) we obtain:
β˜n(1) =
(n+ 1)2
4[(G¯(n− 2) + G¯(n− 1))Un−1] .
Since Un−1 = (n−1)24 , and for δ = 1, G¯(n − 2) = 1 and G¯(n − 1) = 0, we have that
β˜n(1) = 1.
(2) Now, if Gˆ is the distribution function of a binomial random variable with param-
eters (δˆ, n − 1), with δˆ > δ, we have that Gˆ(m) ≤ G(m) for all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}.
This implies that 1 − (1 − Gˆ(m))2 ≤ 1 − (1 − G(m))2. Let hˆm be the probability that
the minimum of two independent binomial random variables with parameters (δˆ, n− 1)
equals m. Then, since Um decreases with m, we have that
n−1∑
m=0
hˆmUm ≤
n−1∑
m=0
hmUm.
Therefore, β˜n is an increasing function of δ.
(3) We know that Um = (n+1)2(2(n−m)+1)6(n−m+1) . Then, the best-response function can be
written as:
β˜n(δ) =
3
2
[
1 +
∑n−1
m=0
n−m
n−m+1hm
] .
Using a change of variable, k = n−m, we obtain:
n−1∑
m=0
n−m
n−m+ 1hm =
n∑
k=1
k
k + 1
hn−k =
n∑
k=0
k
k + 1
hn−k.
Consider two binomial random variables X˜ni , i = 1, 2. Each random variable i is
defined on the same sample space, the space of an infinite number of Bernoulli trials. For
X˜ni we count the number of successes in the first n such trials. The sample spaces for
X˜n1 and X˜
n
2 are independent.
Now, for each n there is also the random variable Y˜ ni counting the number of failures.
Note that X˜ni + Y˜
n
i = n.
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Let rk be the probability that max{Y˜ n1 , Y˜ n2 } = k. Observe that hn−k = rk. So we
have that:
n−1∑
m=0
n−m
n−m+ 1hm =
n∑
k=0
k
k + 1
rk.
Since we have defined these random variables on the same sample space, it is true
that
{Y˜ ni ≥ x} ⊆ {Y˜ n+1i ≥ x}
for any x because any time that we have at least x failures in the first n Bernoulli trials,
we have at least x failures in the first n + 1 Bernoulli trials (past failures cannot be
undone).
By the same token
{max{Y˜ n1 , Y˜ n2 } ≥ x} ⊆ {max{Y˜ n+11 , Y˜ n+12 } ≥ x}.
So that the probability distribution (rk) increases in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance (it actually increases in a stronger sense).
The function k 7→ k/(k + 1) is monotone increasing. Thus the sum
n∑
k=0
k
k + 1
rk
is increasing in n, as it is the expected value of a monotone increasing function, and the
probability law is monotone increasing in n.
Lemma 10. Let  > 0. Then, there exists n0 such that for all n ≥ n0, the function β˜n
defined previously verifies:
3
4(
3
2
+ 
) ≤ β˜n(δ) ≤ βn(δ).
Proof. Since the last Lemma we know that:
hm = xm(G¯(m− 1) + G¯(m))
≤ 2xmG¯(m− 1).
Then,
n−1∑
m=0
hmUm =
n−1∑
m=0
xm(G¯(m− 1) + G¯(m))Um ≤
n−1∑
m=0
2xmG¯(m− 1)Um.
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The median of a binomial distribution with parameter (n, δ) lies within the interval
[bnδc, dnδe]. Moreover, if nδ is an integer, the median is nδ. So, if nδ is an integer
we have that G¯(nδ) = Pr[xm ≥ nδ + 1] ≤ 12 . Otherwise, if nδ is not an integer,
G¯(bnδc) = Pr[xm > bnδc] = Pr[xm ≥ dnδe] ≤ 12 . Thus, if m ≥ bnδc + 1, we have that
G¯(m− 1) ≤ G¯(bnδc) ≤ 1
2
. Then,
n−1∑
m=0
hmUm ≤ 2
b(n−1)δc∑
m=0
UmxmG¯(m− 1) +
n−1∑
m=b(n−1)δc+1
UmxmG¯(m− 1)

≤ 2
b(n−1)δc∑
m=0
Umxm + 1
2
n−1∑
m=b(n−1)δc+1
Umxm

=
b(n−1)δc∑
m=0
Umxm +
n−1∑
m=0
Umxm = g(δ) +
b(n−1)δc∑
m=0
Umxm,
where g(δ) =
∑n−1
m=0 Umxm.
Now, recall that
Um = (n+ 1)
2(2(n−m) + 1)
6(n−m+ 1) .
So we obtain that:
b(n−1)δc∑
m=0
Umxm = (n+ 1)
2
6
b(n−1)δc∑
m=0
(2(n−m) + 1)
n−m+ 1 xm
=
(n+ 1)2
6
b(n−1)δc∑
m=0
(
1 +
(n−m)
n−m+ 1
)
xm
≤ (n+ 1)
2
6
b(n−1)δc∑
m=0
2xm
≤ (n+ 1)
2
6
.
Where, in the last inequality, we use that G(b(n− 1)δc) ≤ 1
2
.
Hence, ∑b(n−1)δc
m=0 Umxm
g(δ)
≤ (n+ 1)
2/6
g(δ)
=
(
n−1∑
m=0
2(n−m) + 1
n−m+ 1 xm
)−1
. (2)
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Now, let  > 0. Choose ρ0, ρ1 ∈ (0, 1) such that:8
1
1 + ρ0ρ1
<
1
2
+ 
Let n be large enough such that
Pr
(
M˜ ≤ n− ρ0
1− ρ0
)
≥ ρ1,
where M˜ is a binomial random variable with parameters (n− 1, δ).
Clearly, the value of n that satisfies the last inequality depends on δ. Moreover, for
higher values of δ, we need to consider higher values of n. Then, assume that δ ≤ 1
2
,
and take n large enough such that the inequality holds. In the last step of the proof, we
extend the result of all values of δ.
Now, m ≤ n− ρ0
1−ρ0 iff ρ0 ≤ (1− ρ0)(n−m) iff
ρ0 ≤ n−m
n−m+ 1 .
Note that
∑n−1
m=0
2(n−m)+1
n−m+1 xm is the expectation of the random variable(
2(n− M˜) + 1
n− M˜ + 1
)
,
then we have:
n−1∑
m=0
2(n−m) + 1
n−m+ 1 xm = EM˜
(
2(n− M˜) + 1
n− M˜ + 1
)
= EM˜1 + EM˜
(
n− M˜
n− M˜ + 1
)
.
Now, note that:
8Note that ρ0 and ρ1 exist since j(x) =
1
1+x is a continuous and decreasing function in [0, 1] with
j(0) = 1 and j(1) = 12 .
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EM˜
(
n− M˜
n− M˜ + 1
)
=
n−1∑
m=0
(
n−m
n−m+ 1
)
xm
≥
bn− ρ0
1−ρ0 c∑
m=0
(
n−m
n−m+ 1
)
xm
≥ ρ0
bn− ρ0
1−ρ0 c∑
m=0
xm
= ρ0Pr
(
M˜ ≤ n− ρ0
1− ρ0
)
≥ ρ0ρ1.
Thus,
n−1∑
m=0
2(n−m) + 1
n−m+ 1 xm ≥ 1 + ρ0ρ1.
Now, using Equation (2) and the definition of ρ0 and ρ1 we obtain that∑b(n−1)δc
m=0 Umxm
g(δ)
≤ 1
1 + ρ0ρ1
<
1
2
+ .
Then,
b(n−1)δc∑
m=0
Umxm < (1
2
+ )g(δ),
which implies that:
n−1∑
m=0
hmUm ≤
(
3
2
+ 
)
g(δ).
Finally, note that:
β˜n(δ) =
(n+ 1)2
4
[∑n−1
m=0 hmUm
]
≥ (n+ 1)
2
4g(δ)
1(
3
2
+ 
)
= βn(δ)
1(
3
2
+ 
) .
Therefore, there exists n0 such that for all n ≥ n0
β˜n(δ) ≥ βn(δ) 1(
3
2
+ 
) ≥ 34(
3
2
+ 
) .
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for all δ ≤ 1
2
.
Since β˜n is an increasing function of δ, if δ > 1
2
β˜n(δ) ≥ β˜n(1/2) ≥
3
4(
3
2
+ 
) .
To prove that β˜n(δ) ≤ βn(δ) just note that 1− (1−G(m))2 ≥ G(m), and since Um is
decreasing in m we have
n−1∑
m=0
Umhm ≥
n−1∑
m=0
Umxm.
Then,
β˜n(δ) =
(n+ 1)2
4
[∑n−1
m=0 Umhm
] ≤ (n+ 1)2
4
[∑n−1
m=0 Umxm
] = βn(δ).
Finally, we have that there exists n0 such that for all n ≥ n0
3
4(
3
2
+ 
) ≤ β˜n(δ) ≤ βn(δ). (3)
The lower bond
(
3
2
+ 
)
is arbitrarily close to 3
2
. Then, for each δ we have that
lim
n→∞
β˜n(δ) ≥ 1
2
.
Since by Lemma 9, β˜n decreases when n increases, we have for all n
1
2
≤ β˜n ≤ βn.
Finally, note that:
1. β˜n is an increasing function of δ,
2. β˜n(1) = 1,
3. βn has two fixed points if n > 10,
4. 1
2
≤ β˜n ≤ βn,
then, β˜n has exactly two fixed point: δ = 1 and the other between 1
2
and 3
4
.
Thus, in the general model, the expected number of agents that go early is at least
(1
2
)n.
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8 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 follows from Theorem 4 by observing that β˜n(F (δ)) ≥ β˜n(δ), by the same
argument as was used in Section 6.
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